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Journal of the American Academy of... Apr 2024Conduct disorder (CD) has been associated with deficits in the use of punishment to guide reinforcement learning (RL) and decision making. This may explain the poorly...
OBJECTIVE
Conduct disorder (CD) has been associated with deficits in the use of punishment to guide reinforcement learning (RL) and decision making. This may explain the poorly planned and often impulsive antisocial and aggressive behavior in affected youths. Here, we used a computational modeling approach to examine differences in RL abilities between CD youths and typically developing controls (TDCs). Specifically, we tested 2 competing hypotheses that RL deficits in CD reflect either reward dominance (also known as reward hypersensitivity) or punishment insensitivity (also known as punishment hyposensitivity).
METHOD
The study included 92 CD youths and 130 TDCs (aged 9-18 years, 48% girls) who completed a probabilistic RL task with reward, punishment, and neutral contingencies. Using computational modeling, we investigated the extent to which the 2 groups differed in their learning abilities to obtain reward and/or to avoid punishment.
RESULTS
RL model comparisons showed that a model with separate learning rates per contingency explained behavioral performance best. Importantly, CD youths showed lower learning rates than TDCs specifically for punishment, whereas learning rates for reward and neutral contingencies did not differ. Moreover, callous-unemotional (CU) traits did not correlate with learning rates in CD.
CONCLUSION
CD youths have a highly selective impairment in probabilistic punishment learning, regardless of their CU traits, whereas reward learning appears to be intact. In summary, our data suggest punishment insensitivity rather than reward dominance in CD. Clinically, the use of punishment-based intervention techniques to achieve effective discipline in patients with CD may be a less helpful strategy than reward-based techniques.
Topics: Female; Adolescent; Humans; Male; Conduct Disorder; Punishment; Learning; Reward; Aggression
PubMed: 37414274
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaac.2023.05.032 -
Proceedings. Biological Sciences Nov 2021Economic experiments have suggested that cooperative humans will altruistically match local levels of cooperation (conditional cooperation) and pay to punish...
Economic experiments have suggested that cooperative humans will altruistically match local levels of cooperation (conditional cooperation) and pay to punish non-cooperators (altruistic punishment). Evolutionary models have suggested that if altruists punish non-altruists this could favour the evolution of costly helping behaviours (cooperation) among strangers. An often-key requirement is that helping behaviours and punishing behaviours form one single conjoined trait (strong reciprocity). Previous economics experiments have provided support for the hypothesis that punishment and cooperation form one conjoined, altruistically motivated, trait. However, such a conjoined trait may be evolutionarily unstable, and previous experiments have confounded a fear of being punished with being surrounded by cooperators, two factors that could favour cooperation. Here, we experimentally decouple the fear of punishment from a cooperative environment and allow cooperation and punishment behaviour to freely separate (420 participants). We show, that if a minority of individuals is made immune to punishment, they (i) learn to stop cooperating on average despite being surrounded by high levels of cooperation, contradicting the idea of conditional cooperation and (ii) often continue to punish, 'hypocritically', showing that cooperation and punishment do not form one, altruistically motivated, linked trait.
Topics: Altruism; Biological Evolution; Cooperative Behavior; Game Theory; Humans; Punishment
PubMed: 34753350
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2021.1611 -
The British Journal of Social Psychology Sep 2014We took an individual differences approach to explain revenge tendencies in powerholders. Across four experimental studies, chronically powerless individuals sought more...
We took an individual differences approach to explain revenge tendencies in powerholders. Across four experimental studies, chronically powerless individuals sought more revenge than chronically powerful individuals following a high power episode (Studies 1 and 2), when striking a powerful pose (Study 3), and when making a powerful hand gesture (Study 4). This relationship vanished when participants were not exposed to incidental power. A meta-analysis revealed that, relative to a lack of power or a neutral context, exposure to incidental power increased vengeance among the chronically powerless and reduced vengeance among the chronically powerful. These findings add to previous research on relations between power and aggression, and underscore the role of individual differences as a determinant of powerholders' destructive responses.
Topics: Aggression; Female; Humans; Individuality; Male; Power, Psychological; Punishment; Social Perception
PubMed: 23841749
DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12044 -
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal... Feb 2016Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to... (Review)
Review
Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones-hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as 'cheating' may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation.
Topics: Animals; Behavior, Animal; Biological Evolution; Cooperative Behavior; Female; Game Theory; Insecta; Male; Models, Biological; Punishment; Reproduction; Social Behavior
PubMed: 26729930
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0090 -
Psychological Science May 2022Across four experiments with U.S.-based online participants ( = 1,495 adults), I found that paying people to engage in moralistic punishment reduces their willingness to...
Across four experiments with U.S.-based online participants ( = 1,495 adults), I found that paying people to engage in moralistic punishment reduces their willingness to do so. In an economic game with real stakes, providing a monetary bonus for engaging in third-party punishment of unfair offers nearly cut participants' willingness to do so in half. In judgments of hypothetical transgressions, participants viewed punishers who accepted payment as having worse character and rated the punishers' punitive actions as less morally acceptable. Willingness to engage in punishment was restored if participants were offered large enough payments or were told that punishment accompanied by payment still signals moral virtue. Data were consistent with a signal-corruption mechanism whereby payment interferes with the prosocial signal that moralistic punishment provides about a punisher's motives. These findings have implications for the cultural evolution of punishment and suggest that understanding perpetrators' sociomoral incentives is essential to implementing conflict-reduction policies.
Topics: Adult; Character; Cooperative Behavior; Humans; Morals; Motivation; Punishment
PubMed: 35486472
DOI: 10.1177/09567976211054786 -
Learning & Memory (Cold Spring Harbor,... Oct 2016Reward and punishment are often thought of as opposing processes: rewards and the environmental cues that predict them elicit approach and consummatory behaviors, while... (Review)
Review
Reward and punishment are often thought of as opposing processes: rewards and the environmental cues that predict them elicit approach and consummatory behaviors, while punishments drive aversion and avoidance behaviors. This framework suggests that there may be segregated brain circuits for these valenced behaviors. The basolateral amygdala (BLA) is one brain region that contributes to both types of motivated behavior. Individual neurons in the BLA can favor positive over negative valence, or vice versa, but these neurons are intermingled, showing no anatomical segregation. The amygdala receives inputs from many brain areas and current theories posit that encoding of positive versus negative valence by BLA neurons is determined by the wiring of each neuron. Specifically, many projections from other brain areas that respond to positive and negative valence stimuli and predictive cues project strongly to the BLA and likely contribute to valence processing within the BLA. Here we review three of these areas, the basal forebrain, the dorsal raphe nucleus and the ventral tegmental area, and discuss how these may promote encoding of positive and negative valence within the BLA.
Topics: Amygdala; Animals; Humans; Neural Pathways; Neurons; Punishment; Reward
PubMed: 27634144
DOI: 10.1101/lm.037887.114 -
International Journal of... Jul 2022Third-party punishment plays a crucial role in fairness norm enforcement. The present study investigated how punishment cost would affect third-parties' behavioral and...
Third-party punishment plays a crucial role in fairness norm enforcement. The present study investigated how punishment cost would affect third-parties' behavioral and neural responses to unfairness using a modified Third-Party Dictator Game and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants acted as third-parties and decided how many monetary units (MUs) to invest to punish norm violations in two punishment cost contexts. Participants' every MU investment reduced dictators' payoff by 6 MUs in the low punishment cost context and 3 MUs in the high one. Participants' invested MUs reflected the cost they would like to pay to punish dictators while dictators' reduced MUs represented the amount of punishment they received. Behavioral results showed participants' fairness ratings were not affected by punishment cost. However, punishment amount decreased in the high punishment cost context where participants invested more MUs and spent more time for decision-making. Neurally, left anterior insula (AI) and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) showed stronger responses to unfair relative to fair allocations in both contexts. Moreover, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) was more active during unfair allocations in the high punishment cost context than in the low one and the difference of dACC activity between these two conditions was positively correlated with the difference of reaction times. Overall, the present study demonstrated that punishment cost would not affect people's fairness perception but increase the conflicts between norm enforcement and self-interest. The decision for punishment was the outcome of integrating fairness and economic considerations.
Topics: Decision Making; Humans; Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Punishment; Reaction Time
PubMed: 35405147
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2022.04.003 -
The Journal of Neuroscience : the... Mar 2018People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice, and the subsequent... (Randomized Controlled Trial)
Randomized Controlled Trial
People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice, and the subsequent decisions to either punish transgressors or compensate victims, is of important social value. By combining a novel decision-making paradigm with functional neuroimaging, we identified specific brain networks that are involved with both the perception of, and response to, social injustice, with reward-related regions preferentially involved in punishment compared with compensation. Developing a computational model of punishment allowed for disentangling the neural mechanisms and psychological motives underlying decisions of whether to punish and, subsequently, of how severely to punish. Results show that the neural mechanisms underlying punishment differ depending on whether one is directly affected by the injustice, or whether one is a third-party observer of a violation occurring to another. Specifically, the anterior insula was involved in decisions to punish following harm, whereas, in third-party scenarios, we found amygdala activity associated with punishment severity. Additionally, we used a pharmacological intervention using oxytocin, and found that oxytocin influenced participants' fairness expectations, and in particular enhanced the frequency of low punishments. Together, these results not only provide more insight into the fundamental brain mechanisms underlying punishment and compensation, but also illustrate the importance of taking an explorative, multimethod approach when unraveling the complex components of everyday decision-making. The perception of injustice is a fundamental precursor to many disagreements, from small struggles at the dinner table to wasteful conflict between cultures and countries. Despite its clear importance, relatively little is known about how the brain processes these violations. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, we combine methods from neuroscience, psychology, and economics to explore the neurobiological mechanisms involved in both the perception of injustice as well as the punishment and compensation decisions that follow. Using a novel behavioral paradigm, we identified specific brain networks, developed a computational model of punishment, and found that administrating the neuropeptide oxytocin increases the administration of low punishments of norm violations in particular. Results provide valuable insights into the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms underlying social injustice.
Topics: Brain; Compensation and Redress; Computer Simulation; Decision Making; Double-Blind Method; Humans; Male; Oxytocin; Punishment; Reward; Social Justice; Young Adult
PubMed: 29459373
DOI: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1242-17.2018 -
Scientific Reports Aug 2023Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are...
Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are willing to incur costs to punish selfish behaviors and to reward altruistic behaviors, but how their willingness to do so depends on their relationship with the individuals conducting the anti-social or pro-social behaviors is much less explored. To probe into this question, we devised a three-stage experiment that combined a revised dictator game and third-party reward or punishment. We employed two payoff frameworks, alignment and conflict, and analyzed how third-party's willingness to reward and punish differed when their interests were either aligned or in conflict with the first-party under observation. We found that due to considerations for personal interests, third-party's reward and punishment levels deviated from what was deemed "legitimate" by society, that is, the level of reward and punishment that enhances society's intrinsic motivations to comply with social norms and act pro-socially. When an anti-social behavior was observed, third-party punished less severely under the alignment framework than under the conflict framework; when a pro-social behavior was observed, third-party demonstrated self-serving reward under the alignment framework, but they rewarded altruistically under the conflict framework. These findings provided evidence for third-party's self-serving reward and punishment.
Topics: Humans; Punishment; Laboratories; Altruism; Social Behavior; Reward
PubMed: 37634044
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41256-5 -
Proceedings of the National Academy of... Jun 2023The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on...
The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on explaining how cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained by direct and indirect reciprocity among the participants of the social dilemma. However, in complex human societies, both modern and ancient, cooperation is frequently maintained by means of specialized third-party enforcement. We provide an evolutionary-game-theoretic model that explains how specialized third-party enforcement of cooperation (specialized reciprocity) can emerge. A population consists of producers and enforcers. First, producers engage in a joint undertaking represented by a prisoner's dilemma. They are paired randomly and receive no information about their partner's history, which precludes direct and indirect reciprocity. Then, enforcers tax producers and may punish their clients. Finally, the enforcers are randomly paired and may try to grab resources from each other. In order to sustain producer cooperation, enforcers must punish defecting producers, but punishing is costly to enforcers. We show that the threat of potential intraenforcer conflict can incentivize enforcers to engage in costly punishment of producers, provided they are sufficiently informed to maintain a reputation system. That is, the "guards" are guarded by the guards themselves. We demonstrate the key mechanisms analytically and corroborate our results with numerical simulations.
Topics: Humans; Cooperative Behavior; Models, Psychological; Punishment; Biological Evolution; Records; Game Theory
PubMed: 37279275
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2207029120