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Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Jun 2020Social punishment (SOP)-third-party punishment (TPP) and second-party punishment (SPP)-sanctions norm-deviant behavior. The hierarchical punishment model (HPM) posits... (Meta-Analysis)
Meta-Analysis Review
Social punishment (SOP)-third-party punishment (TPP) and second-party punishment (SPP)-sanctions norm-deviant behavior. The hierarchical punishment model (HPM) posits that TPP is an extension of SPP and both recruit common processes engaging large-scale domain-general brain networks. Here, we provided meta-analytic evidence to the HPM by combining the activation likelihood estimation approach with connectivity analyses and hierarchical clustering analyses. Although both forms of SOP engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilateral anterior insula (AI), a functional differentiation also emerged with TPP preferentially engaging social cognitive regions (temporoparietal junction) and SPP affective regions (AI). Further, although both TPP and SPP recruit domain-general networks (salience, default-mode, and central-executive networks), some specificity in network organization was observed. By revealing differences and commonalities of the neural networks consistently activated by different types of SOP, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the neuropsychological mechanisms of social punishment behavior--one of the most peculiar human behaviors.
Topics: Brain; Brain Mapping; Humans; Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Prefrontal Cortex; Punishment
PubMed: 32302599
DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.04.011 -
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal... Feb 2016Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to... (Review)
Review
Cheaters-genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating-are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones-hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as 'cheating' may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation.
Topics: Animals; Behavior, Animal; Biological Evolution; Cooperative Behavior; Female; Game Theory; Insecta; Male; Models, Biological; Punishment; Reproduction; Social Behavior
PubMed: 26729930
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0090 -
Psychiatry Research Apr 2021Reversal learning deficits following reward and punishment processing are observed across disruptive behaviors (DB) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),...
Reversal learning deficits following reward and punishment processing are observed across disruptive behaviors (DB) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and have been associated with callous-unemotional (CU) traits. However, it remains unknown to what extent these altered reinforcement sensitivities are linked to the co-occurrence of oppositional traits, ADHD symptoms, and CU traits. Reward and punishment sensitivity and perseverative behavior were therefore derived from a probabilistic reversal learning task to investigate reinforcement sensitivity in participants with DB (n=183, ODD=62, CD=10, combined=57, age-range 8-18), ADHD (n=144, age-range 11-28), and controls (n=191, age-range 8-26). The SNAP-IV and Conners rating scales were used to assess oppositional and ADHD traits. The Inventory of CU traits was used to assess CU traits. Decreased reward sensitivity was associated with ADHD symptom severity (p=0.018) if corrected for oppositional symptoms. ADHD symptomatology interacted with oppositional behavior on perseveration (p=0.019), with the former aggravating the effect of oppositional behavior on perseveration and vice versa. Within a pooled sample, reversal learning alterations were associated with the severity of ADHD symptoms, underpinned by hyposensitivity to reward and increased perseveration. These results show ADHD traits, as opposed to oppositional behavior and CU traits, is associated with decreased reward-based learning in adolescents and adults.
Topics: Adolescent; Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity; Attention Deficit and Disruptive Behavior Disorders; Conduct Disorder; Humans; Punishment; Reward
PubMed: 33582524
DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2021.113795 -
Learning & Memory (Cold Spring Harbor,... Oct 2016Reward and punishment are often thought of as opposing processes: rewards and the environmental cues that predict them elicit approach and consummatory behaviors, while... (Review)
Review
Reward and punishment are often thought of as opposing processes: rewards and the environmental cues that predict them elicit approach and consummatory behaviors, while punishments drive aversion and avoidance behaviors. This framework suggests that there may be segregated brain circuits for these valenced behaviors. The basolateral amygdala (BLA) is one brain region that contributes to both types of motivated behavior. Individual neurons in the BLA can favor positive over negative valence, or vice versa, but these neurons are intermingled, showing no anatomical segregation. The amygdala receives inputs from many brain areas and current theories posit that encoding of positive versus negative valence by BLA neurons is determined by the wiring of each neuron. Specifically, many projections from other brain areas that respond to positive and negative valence stimuli and predictive cues project strongly to the BLA and likely contribute to valence processing within the BLA. Here we review three of these areas, the basal forebrain, the dorsal raphe nucleus and the ventral tegmental area, and discuss how these may promote encoding of positive and negative valence within the BLA.
Topics: Amygdala; Animals; Humans; Neural Pathways; Neurons; Punishment; Reward
PubMed: 27634144
DOI: 10.1101/lm.037887.114 -
The Journal of Neuroscience : the... Mar 2018People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice, and the subsequent... (Randomized Controlled Trial)
Randomized Controlled Trial
People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice, and the subsequent decisions to either punish transgressors or compensate victims, is of important social value. By combining a novel decision-making paradigm with functional neuroimaging, we identified specific brain networks that are involved with both the perception of, and response to, social injustice, with reward-related regions preferentially involved in punishment compared with compensation. Developing a computational model of punishment allowed for disentangling the neural mechanisms and psychological motives underlying decisions of whether to punish and, subsequently, of how severely to punish. Results show that the neural mechanisms underlying punishment differ depending on whether one is directly affected by the injustice, or whether one is a third-party observer of a violation occurring to another. Specifically, the anterior insula was involved in decisions to punish following harm, whereas, in third-party scenarios, we found amygdala activity associated with punishment severity. Additionally, we used a pharmacological intervention using oxytocin, and found that oxytocin influenced participants' fairness expectations, and in particular enhanced the frequency of low punishments. Together, these results not only provide more insight into the fundamental brain mechanisms underlying punishment and compensation, but also illustrate the importance of taking an explorative, multimethod approach when unraveling the complex components of everyday decision-making. The perception of injustice is a fundamental precursor to many disagreements, from small struggles at the dinner table to wasteful conflict between cultures and countries. Despite its clear importance, relatively little is known about how the brain processes these violations. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, we combine methods from neuroscience, psychology, and economics to explore the neurobiological mechanisms involved in both the perception of injustice as well as the punishment and compensation decisions that follow. Using a novel behavioral paradigm, we identified specific brain networks, developed a computational model of punishment, and found that administrating the neuropeptide oxytocin increases the administration of low punishments of norm violations in particular. Results provide valuable insights into the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms underlying social injustice.
Topics: Brain; Compensation and Redress; Computer Simulation; Decision Making; Double-Blind Method; Humans; Male; Oxytocin; Punishment; Reward; Social Justice; Young Adult
PubMed: 29459373
DOI: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1242-17.2018 -
Scientific Reports Aug 2023Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are...
Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are willing to incur costs to punish selfish behaviors and to reward altruistic behaviors, but how their willingness to do so depends on their relationship with the individuals conducting the anti-social or pro-social behaviors is much less explored. To probe into this question, we devised a three-stage experiment that combined a revised dictator game and third-party reward or punishment. We employed two payoff frameworks, alignment and conflict, and analyzed how third-party's willingness to reward and punish differed when their interests were either aligned or in conflict with the first-party under observation. We found that due to considerations for personal interests, third-party's reward and punishment levels deviated from what was deemed "legitimate" by society, that is, the level of reward and punishment that enhances society's intrinsic motivations to comply with social norms and act pro-socially. When an anti-social behavior was observed, third-party punished less severely under the alignment framework than under the conflict framework; when a pro-social behavior was observed, third-party demonstrated self-serving reward under the alignment framework, but they rewarded altruistically under the conflict framework. These findings provided evidence for third-party's self-serving reward and punishment.
Topics: Humans; Punishment; Laboratories; Altruism; Social Behavior; Reward
PubMed: 37634044
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41256-5 -
Journal of the Royal Society, Interface Feb 2021One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary pay-offs of others.... (Review)
Review
One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary pay-offs of others. However, during the last 10 years, research has shown that different types of unselfish behaviour, including cooperation, altruism, truth-telling, altruistic punishment and trustworthiness are in fact better explained by preferences for following one's own personal norms-internal standards about what is right or wrong in a given situation. Beyond better organizing various forms of unselfish behaviour, this moral preference hypothesis has recently also been used to increase charitable donations, simply by means of interventions that make the morality of an action salient. Here we review experimental and theoretical work dedicated to this rapidly growing field of research, and in doing so we outline mathematical foundations for moral preferences that can be used in future models to better understand selfless human actions and to adjust policies accordingly. These foundations can also be used by artificial intelligence to better navigate the complex landscape of human morality.
Topics: Altruism; Artificial Intelligence; Cooperative Behavior; Humans; Mathematics; Morals; Punishment
PubMed: 33561377
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0880 -
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal... Nov 2021Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that...
Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences-including confrontation, gossip and ostracism-which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
Topics: Communication; Cooperative Behavior; Emotions; Humans; Ostracism; Punishment
PubMed: 34601906
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0289 -
Journal of Safety Research Dec 2023Understanding the consequences of non-punitive sanctions and feedback for nonintentional deviations (i.e., errors) is important to effective safety policy. This study... (Randomized Controlled Trial)
Randomized Controlled Trial
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the consequences of non-punitive sanctions and feedback for nonintentional deviations (i.e., errors) is important to effective safety policy. This study aims to address a lack of research on the effects of punishment and feedback on correcting erroneous behavior in the context of multitasking.
METHOD
A Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB-II) was employed to simulate the demands of aviating, an important area of applied safety. Sixty participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups (no intervention, punishment, feedback, punishment + feedback) and asked to perform the MATB-II. Punishment, feedback, and punishment + feedback decreased error and increased performance, with punishment alone having the greatest effect.
RESULTS
The results highlight the need for behavioral consequences or feedback to reduce erroneous behavior.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
From an applied perspective, these results have implications for policy and training.
Topics: Humans; Punishment; Feedback
PubMed: 38081719
DOI: 10.1016/j.jsr.2023.09.001 -
Proceedings of the National Academy of... Jun 2023The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on...
The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on explaining how cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained by direct and indirect reciprocity among the participants of the social dilemma. However, in complex human societies, both modern and ancient, cooperation is frequently maintained by means of specialized third-party enforcement. We provide an evolutionary-game-theoretic model that explains how specialized third-party enforcement of cooperation (specialized reciprocity) can emerge. A population consists of producers and enforcers. First, producers engage in a joint undertaking represented by a prisoner's dilemma. They are paired randomly and receive no information about their partner's history, which precludes direct and indirect reciprocity. Then, enforcers tax producers and may punish their clients. Finally, the enforcers are randomly paired and may try to grab resources from each other. In order to sustain producer cooperation, enforcers must punish defecting producers, but punishing is costly to enforcers. We show that the threat of potential intraenforcer conflict can incentivize enforcers to engage in costly punishment of producers, provided they are sufficiently informed to maintain a reputation system. That is, the "guards" are guarded by the guards themselves. We demonstrate the key mechanisms analytically and corroborate our results with numerical simulations.
Topics: Humans; Cooperative Behavior; Models, Psychological; Punishment; Biological Evolution; Records; Game Theory
PubMed: 37279275
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2207029120