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Psychology and Aging Sep 2023In general, research on aging and decision-making has grown in recent years. Yet, little work has investigated how reliance on classic heuristics may differ across...
In general, research on aging and decision-making has grown in recent years. Yet, little work has investigated how reliance on classic heuristics may differ across adulthood. For example, younger adults rely on the availability of information from memory when judging the relative frequency of plane crashes versus car accidents, but it is unclear if older adults are similarly reliant on this heuristic. In the present study, participants aged 20-90 years old made judgments that could be answered by relying on five different heuristics: anchoring, availability, recognition, representativeness, and sunk-cost bias. We found no evidence of age-related differences in the use of the classic heuristics-younger and older adults employed anchoring, availability, recognition, and representativeness to equal degrees in order to make decisions. However, replicating past work, we found age-related differences in the sunk-cost bias-older adults were more likely to avoid this fallacy compared to younger adults. We explain these different patterns by drawing on the distinctive roles that stored knowledge and personal experience likely play across heuristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Humans; Aged; Adult; Aged, 80 and over; Decision Making; Heuristics; Aging; Judgment; Recognition, Psychology
PubMed: 36757964
DOI: 10.1037/pag0000726 -
Cognitive Psychology Sep 2023Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., "by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control") are common expressions of epistemic...
Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., "by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control") are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretations of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions is conducted to classify participants according to the three semantic theories of Relativism, Contextualism, and Objectivism. Through this study, some of the first empirical evidence for the kind of truth-value shifts postulated by semantic Relativism is presented. It is furthermore found that participants' disagreement judgments match their truth evaluations and that participants are capable of distinguishing between truth and justification. In a second experimental session, it is investigated whether participants thus classified follow the norm of retraction which Relativism uses to account for argumentation with epistemic modals. Here the results are less favorable for Relativism. In a second experiment, these results are replicated and the normative beliefs of participants concerning the norm of retraction are investigated following work on measuring norms by Bicchieri (2017). Again, it is found that on average participants show no strong preferences concerning the norm of retraction for epistemic modals. Yet, it was found that participants who had committed to Objectivism and had training in logic applied the norm of retraction to might-statements. These results present a substantial challenge to the account of argumentation with epistemic modals presented in MacFarlane (2014), as discussed.
Topics: Humans; Pandemics; COVID-19; Semantics; Judgment; Uncertainty
PubMed: 37586285
DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101591 -
Journal of Personality and Social... Aug 2023People commonly establish in advance the thresholds they use to pass social judgment (e.g., promising reward/punishment after a fixed number of good/bad behaviors). Ten...
People commonly establish in advance the thresholds they use to pass social judgment (e.g., promising reward/punishment after a fixed number of good/bad behaviors). Ten preregistered experiments ( = 5,542) reveal when, why, and how people their social judgment thresholds, even after formally establishing them based on having full information about what might unfold. People can be swayed to be both "quicker to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then acting after 2 such behaviors) and "slower to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then withholding until 4 such behaviors)-despite all behaviors obeying their threshold. We document these discrepancies across many parameters. We also propose and test an integrative theoretical framework to explain them, rooted in : Being both "quicker" and "slower" to judge reflect a shared function of the distinct modes of evaluation involved in the act of setting social judgment thresholds (involving a packed summary judgment extending across myriad possible realities) versus following them in real time (involving an unpacked focus on whatever specific reality unfolds, which could provide higher or lower support than threshold setters had accounted for). Manipulating the degree of psychological support thus determines the direction of threshold violations: Higher support produces "quicker to judge" effects while lower support produces "slower to judge" effects. Finally, although violating one's preset threshold may sometimes be to one's benefit, we document initial evidence that it also risks damaging people's reputations and relationships. When it comes to treating others, making exceptions to the rule may often be the rule-for better or worse. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Humans; Judgment
PubMed: 36848103
DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000339 -
Nurse Education Today Mar 2024To map current assessment practices for learning outcomes related to nurses' clinical judgment from undergraduate education to entry to practice. (Review)
Review
OBJECTIVE
To map current assessment practices for learning outcomes related to nurses' clinical judgment from undergraduate education to entry to practice.
DESIGN
Scoping review using the Joanna Briggs Institute guidelines and reported according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA).
DATA SOURCES
Electronic databases-Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL Complete; EBSCOhost), EMBASE (Ovid), MEDLINE (Ovid), PsycINFO (Ovid), and Web of Science (Social Sciences Citation Index, Citation Index Expanded)-using a combination of descriptors and keywords related to nursing students, newly graduated nurses, clinical judgment and related terms (e.g., critical thinking, clinical reasoning, clinical decision-making, and problem-solving), and assessment.
METHODS
Two reviewers independently extracted study characteristics and, for each outcome relevant to clinical judgment, the concept, definition and framework, assessment tool, and the number and schedule of assessments. Data were synthesized narratively and using descriptive statistics.
RESULTS
Most of the 52 reviewed studies examined the outcome of a discrete educational intervention (76.9 %) in academic settings (78.8 %). Only six studies (11.5 %) involved newly graduated nurses. Clinical judgment (34.6 %), critical thinking (26.9 %), and clinical reasoning (9.6 %) were the three most frequent concepts. Three assessment tools were used in more than one study: the Lasater Clinical Judgment Rubric (n = 22, 42.3 %), the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (n = 9, 17.3 %), and the Health Science Reasoning Test (n = 2, 3.8 %). Eleven studies (21.2 %) used assessment tools designed for the study.
CONCLUSION
In addition to a disparate understanding of underlying concepts, there are minimal published studies on the assessment of nursing students and nurses' clinical judgment, especially for longitudinal assessment from education to clinical practice. Although there is some existing research on this topic, further studies are necessary to establish valid and reliable clinical competency assessment methods that effectively integrate clinical judgment in clinical situations at relevant time points.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Students, Nursing; Thinking; Education, Nursing, Baccalaureate; Clinical Reasoning
PubMed: 38184981
DOI: 10.1016/j.nedt.2023.106078 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Jul 2023We compare the predictions of two important proposals made by De Neys to findings in the anchoring effect literature. Evidence for an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic...
We compare the predictions of two important proposals made by De Neys to findings in the anchoring effect literature. Evidence for an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic supports his proposal that system 1 and system 2 are non-exclusive. The relationship between psychophysical noise and anchoring effects, however, challenges his proposal that epistemic uncertainty determines the involvement of system 2 corrective processes in judgment.
Topics: Humans; Uncertainty; Judgment
PubMed: 37462172
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X2200303X -
Quarterly Journal of Experimental... Dec 2023Jesteadt et al. discovered a remarkable pattern of autocorrelation in log estimates of loudness. Responses to repeated stimuli correlated to about +0.7, but that...
Jesteadt et al. discovered a remarkable pattern of autocorrelation in log estimates of loudness. Responses to repeated stimuli correlated to about +0.7, but that correlation was much reduced (0.1) following large differences between successive stimuli. The experiment reported here demonstrates the same pattern in absolute identification without feedback; if feedback is supplied, the pattern is much muted. A model is proposed for this pattern of autocorrelation, based on the premise: "There is no absolute judgment of sensory magnitudes; nor is there any absolute judgment of differences/ratios between sensory magnitudes." Each stimulus in an experiment is compared with its predecessor, greater, less than, or about the same. The of that comparison increases with the difference in magnitude between the stimuli, so the assessment of a stimulus far removed from its predecessor is very uncertain. The model provides explanations for the apparent normal variability of sensory stimuli, for the "bow" effect and for the widely reported pattern of sequential effects. It has applications to the effects of stimulus range, to the difficulty of identifying more than five stimuli on a single continuum without error, and to inspection tasks in general, notably medical screening and the marking of examination scripts.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Uncertainty; Feedback
PubMed: 36790111
DOI: 10.1177/17470218231159393 -
Journal of Experimental Psychology.... Mar 2024The outcome of any scientific experiment or intervention will naturally unfold over time. How then should individuals make causal inferences from measurements over time?...
The outcome of any scientific experiment or intervention will naturally unfold over time. How then should individuals make causal inferences from measurements over time? Across three experiments, we had participants observe experimental and control groups over several days posttreatment in a fictional biological research setting. We identify competing perspectives in the literature: contingency-driven accounts predict no effect of the outcome timing while the contiguity principle suggests people will view a treatment as more harmful to the extent that bad treatment outcomes occur earlier rather than later. In contrast, inference of the functional form of a treatment effect can license extrapolation beyond the measurements and lead to different causal inferences. We find participants' causal strength and direction judgments in temporal settings vary with minimal manipulations of instruction framing. When it is implied that the observations are made over a preplanned number of days, causal judgments depend strongly on contiguity. When it is implied that the observation may be ongoing, participants extrapolate current trends into the future and adapt their causal judgments accordingly. When data are revealed sequentially, participants rely on extrapolation regardless of instruction framing. Our results demonstrate human flexibility in interpreting temporal evidence for causal reasoning and emphasize human tendency to generalize from evidence in ways that are acutely sensitive to task framing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Problem Solving; Forecasting; Time
PubMed: 38236250
DOI: 10.1037/xge0001534 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Oct 2023Our recent review demonstrates that "purity" is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify...
Our recent review demonstrates that "purity" is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify some of these understandings, but much messiness remains. The harm-centric theory of dyadic morality suggests that purity violations can be comprehensively understood as , acts perceived by some people (and not others) to indirectly cause suffering.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Morals; Self-Control
PubMed: 37789548
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X23000286 -
Acta Psychologica May 2024The aim of this study was to systematically examine the effect of awe-inducing stimuli on the judgment of time. Three experiments were conducted using temporal bisection...
The aim of this study was to systematically examine the effect of awe-inducing stimuli on the judgment of time. Three experiments were conducted using temporal bisection tasks in which participants viewed awe-inducing and no awe-inducing images presented for different durations and were asked to judge whether their duration was similar to a short or long anchor duration. Images of panoramic landscapes and images of the faces of well-known and admired people were used in experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In experiment 3, they did not judge the duration of the images, but that of a neutral stimulus occurring during the presentation of images. In each experiment, participants rated the awe-inducing and no-awe-inducing images according to their components: admiration, beauty, awe, emotional valence, arousal, symbolic self-size, and full-body self-size. Results consistently showed significant time distortions when participants viewed the different awe-inducing images compared to the no-awe images, although the effect was weaker for the images of faces than for those of landscapes. Time distortion took the form of temporal lengthening in Experiments 1 and 2 and shortening in Experiment 3. These different temporal distortions are consistent with attention effects due to awe-inducing stimuli which capture attention to the detriment of time processing.
Topics: Humans; Time Perception; Emotions; Arousal; Time Factors; Judgment
PubMed: 38522351
DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104232 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Jul 2023De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two...
De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Emotions; Intuition; Morals
PubMed: 37462175
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22003193