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The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Sep 2022Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism,... (Review)
Review
Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.
Topics: Humans; Morals; Cognition; Self-Control; Motivation
PubMed: 36111617
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22002047 -
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Sep 2023I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that...
I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for their actual future offspring, that justification is preserved only if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for their potential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or subjective valuation of the opportunity is of the relevant type and valence to justify not assisting needy children and (b) the agent sincerely values the opportunity. Fifth, I argue that (a) is unsatisfied and that while (b) is satisfied in most cases, it entails that most agents are obligated to desire or be behaviourally disposed to pursue procreation for themselves (i.e., SPN). Thus, I conclude that both actual procreation and procreative potential are either insufficient justifications for not assisting needy children or that they entail obligatory pro-reproductive attitudes or behaviours.
Topics: Pregnancy; Female; Child; Humans; Reproduction; Dissent and Disputes; Attitude; Morals; Moral Obligations
PubMed: 37010702
DOI: 10.1007/s11673-023-10234-x -
BMC Medical Ethics Mar 2023The overarching aim of this article is to scrutinize how severity can work as a qualifier for the moral impetus of malady. While there is agreement that malady is of...
The overarching aim of this article is to scrutinize how severity can work as a qualifier for the moral impetus of malady. While there is agreement that malady is of negative value, there is disagreement about precisely how this is so. Nevertheless, alleviating disease, injury, and associated suffering is almost universally considered good. Furthermore, the strength of a diseased person's moral claims for our attention and efforts will inevitably vary. This article starts by reflecting on what kind of moral impetus malady incites. We then analyze how severity may qualify this impetus. We do so by discussing the relationship between severity and need, well-being and disvalue, death, urgency, rule of rescue, and distributive justice. We then summarize our thoughts about severity as a moral qualifier. We conclude that severity is, and should continue to be seen, as a morally significant concept that deserves continued attention in the future.
Topics: Humans; Morals; Social Justice; Dissent and Disputes
PubMed: 37004054
DOI: 10.1186/s12910-023-00903-2 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Oct 2023The theory proposed by Fitouchi et al. misses the core of puritanical morality: Cruel punishment for harmless actions. Punishment is mutually harmful, unlike cooperation...
The theory proposed by Fitouchi et al. misses the core of puritanical morality: Cruel punishment for harmless actions. Punishment is mutually harmful, unlike cooperation which is mutually beneficial. Theories of moral judgment should not obscure this fundamental distinction.
Topics: Humans; Punishment; Morals; Judgment
PubMed: 37789542
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X23000377 -
AJOB Neuroscience 2023
Topics: Humans; Moral Status; Consciousness; Morals; Antisocial Personality Disorder
PubMed: 37097854
DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2023.2188290 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Oct 2023The suggestion that there is a need to moralize bodily pleasures for uncooperative self-control failures doesn't fit with the historical record. I counter that the...
The suggestion that there is a need to moralize bodily pleasures for uncooperative self-control failures doesn't fit with the historical record. I counter that the development of puritanical values was an instrument of coercion and control, rather than an adaptation for cooperation. Confusing cooperation with coercion and moral principles with conventional norms leads to misconceptions about societal arrangements.
Topics: Humans; Coercion; Morals
PubMed: 37789527
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X23000547 -
Journal of Medical Ethics Aug 2022In this paper, we argue that providers who conscientiously refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted medical care are not always morally required to refer...
In this paper, we argue that providers who conscientiously refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted medical care are not always morally required to refer their patients to willing providers. Indeed, we will argue that refusing to refer is morally admirable in certain instances. In making the case, we show that belief in a sweeping moral duty to refer depends on an implicit assumption that the procedures sanctioned by legal and professional norms are ethically permissible. Focusing on examples of female genital cutting, clitoridectomy and 'normalizing' surgery for children with intersex traits, we argue that this assumption is untenable and that providers are not morally required to refer when refusing to perform genuinely unethical procedures. The fact that acceptance of our thesis would force us to face the challenge of distinguishing between ethical and unethical medical practices is a virtue. This is the central task of medical ethics, and we must confront it rather than evade it.
Topics: Child; Conscience; Ethics, Medical; Female; Humans; Male; Moral Obligations; Morals; Refusal to Treat
PubMed: 34233957
DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2020-107025 -
BMJ Military Health Dec 2021Morally injurious incidents may present ethical or legal quandaries, yet how military or civilian clinicians should manage such disclosures is poorly understood....
Morally injurious incidents may present ethical or legal quandaries, yet how military or civilian clinicians should manage such disclosures is poorly understood. Individuals who experience moral injury may be reluctant to seek help due to concerns about the legal ramifications of disclosure. Guidance on breaching patient confidentiality differs by regulatory body but also by profession, geography and context. As moral injury continues to become recognised in clinical practice, in the military and elsewhere, clarity is needed regarding best practice in managing moral injury cases and the dilemmas they present.
Topics: Confidentiality; Disclosure; Ethics, Medical; Humans; Morals; Stress Disorders, Post-Traumatic
PubMed: 32665422
DOI: 10.1136/bmjmilitary-2020-001534 -
Journal of Oral Pathology & Medicine :... Apr 2023Human error is inevitable, and therefore can be considered as a 'normal' part of everyday life. Unfortunately, error can never be eliminated completely. However,... (Review)
Review
BACKGROUND
Human error is inevitable, and therefore can be considered as a 'normal' part of everyday life. Unfortunately, error can never be eliminated completely. However, learning from our mistakes can help reduce problems in future. Fifty years ago, most clinicians paid little or no attention to the human factors (HF) that can affect individual and team performance. It has only been in the last 20-25 years that colleagues in healthcare have truly begun recognizing the importance of HF and non-technical skills in medicine and dentistry and how their application can significantly improve patient safety and aid better team working and staff morale in the clinical setting and laboratory.
DISCUSSION
Personal factors such as stress, tiredness, hunger and dehydration all reduce human performance and can raise the risk of mistakes. In addition, how we work and interact with the wider team is important since many errors can occur because of ineffective communication, steep hierarchal (authority) gradients and loss of situational awareness. This short HF overview in the 50th commemorative special of JOPM issue is timely. It provides a contemporary overview of human factors and performance that the authors consider important for oral medicine and pathology colleagues and which can affect individuals and teams This article also discuss ways to reduce the chances of medical and dental error and improve patient safety.
Topics: Humans; Patient Safety; Pathology, Oral; Morale; Awareness
PubMed: 36629843
DOI: 10.1111/jop.13404 -
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare... Apr 2021This paper addresses a dichotomy in the attitudes of some clinicians and bioethicists regarding whether there is a moral difference between deactivating a cardiac...
This paper addresses a dichotomy in the attitudes of some clinicians and bioethicists regarding whether there is a moral difference between deactivating a cardiac pacemaker in a highly dependent patient at the end of life, as opposed to standard cases of withdrawal of treatment. Although many clinicians hold that there is a difference, some bioethicists maintain that the two sorts of cases are morally equivalent. The author explores one potential morally significant point of difference between pacemakers and certain other life-sustaining treatments: specifically, that the former are biofixtures, which become part of the patient in a way that the latter do not. The concept of the pacemaker as biofixture grants pacemakers a unique moral status that gives reason to treat a pacemaker the same as other parts of the patient that are necessary to sustain life. The author employs this biofixture analysis to affirm the intuition that deactivating a pacemaker in a highly dependent patient at the end of life is, in moral terms, more analogous to active euthanasia than it is to standard cases of withdrawal of treatment. The paper concludes with consideration of potential implications for further implantable medical technologies, such as ventricular assist devices and total artificial hearts.
Topics: Heart Rate; Humans; Morals; Pacemaker, Artificial
PubMed: 33764293
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180120000845