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British Journal of Anaesthesia Mar 1992
Topics: Awareness; Consciousness; Humans; Somatosensory Cortex
PubMed: 1547062
DOI: 10.1093/bja/68.3.325-b -
BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) Apr 1990
Topics: Anesthesia, General; Anesthetics; Awareness; Cognition; Humans
PubMed: 2337720
DOI: 10.1136/bmj.300.6729.938 -
Lancet (London, England) May 2000
Topics: Anesthesia, General; Awareness; Humans; Mental Recall; Monitoring, Intraoperative; Physician-Patient Relations; Unconscious, Psychology
PubMed: 10905264
DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(05)73125-1 -
Anaesthesia Oct 1982
Topics: Anesthesia; Awareness; Cognition; Humans
PubMed: 7137553
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2044.1982.tb01724.x -
Journal of Sleep Research Apr 2015The implications of sleep for morality are only starting to be explored. Extending the ethics literature, we contend that because bringing morality to conscious...
The implications of sleep for morality are only starting to be explored. Extending the ethics literature, we contend that because bringing morality to conscious attention requires effort, a lack of sleep leads to low moral awareness. We test this prediction with three studies. A laboratory study with a manipulation of sleep across 90 participants judging a scenario for moral content indicates that a lack of sleep leads to low moral awareness. An archival study of Google Trends data across 6 years highlights a national dip in Web searches for moral topics (but not other topics) on the Monday after the Spring time change, which tends to deprive people of sleep. Finally, a diary study of 127 participants indicates that (within participants) nights with a lack of sleep are associated with low moral awareness the next day. Together, these three studies suggest that a lack of sleep leaves people less morally aware, with important implications for the recognition of morality in others.
Topics: Adult; Attention; Awareness; Female; Humans; Internet; Male; Morals; Sleep; Sleep Deprivation; Sleep Stages
PubMed: 25159702
DOI: 10.1111/jsr.12231 -
Cognitive Processing Feb 2010The nature of the 'self' and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the... (Review)
Review
The nature of the 'self' and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an 'I', corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a 'Me', as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting one's self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the 'I' and the 'Me' in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about 'I'-related and 'Me'-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.
Topics: Awareness; Cognition; Consciousness; Humans; Self Concept
PubMed: 19763648
DOI: 10.1007/s10339-009-0336-1 -
Proceedings of the National Academy of... Apr 2021Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and...
Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys ( These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.
Topics: Animals; Awareness; Brain; Consciousness; Macaca mulatta; Visual Perception
PubMed: 33785543
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2017543118 -
Current Biology : CB Apr 2022The extent to which young human infants are conscious, in the sense of being perceptually aware of their environment, has been long debated. A new study has revealed...
The extent to which young human infants are conscious, in the sense of being perceptually aware of their environment, has been long debated. A new study has revealed that infants do exhibit a key signature of consciousness - the attentional blink - but this early consciousness changes with age.
Topics: Attentional Blink; Awareness; Consciousness; Humans; Visual Perception
PubMed: 35413260
DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2022.02.045 -
Der Anaesthesist Apr 2001Inapparent adverse intraoperative wakefulness is still a relevant problem in modern anaesthetic routine. It can be associated with serious negative effects on the... (Review)
Review
Inapparent adverse intraoperative wakefulness is still a relevant problem in modern anaesthetic routine. It can be associated with serious negative effects on the postoperative recovery of the patients. Several different procedures have been developed to monitor and therefore avoid intraoperative situations of wakefulness during general anaesthesia. The most promising methods are the PRST-score, calculated from changes in the blood pressure, heart rate, sweating and tear production, the so-called isolated forearm technique, spontaneous EEG and its derived parameters such as spectral edge frequencies or BIS and finally mid-latency auditory evoked potentials. The observation of clinical autonomic signs, even including the calculation of the PRST-score does not seem to be valid enough to indicate or predict intraoperative wakefulness. The isolated forearm technique can be regarded as the most reliable tool to detect intraoperative wakefulness, but it can only be applied for a very limited period of time. The processed EEG with the median frequency, spectral edge frequency or bispectral index are important scientific tools to quantify central anaesthetic effects especially to develop pharmacodynamic-pharmacokinetic models of anaesthetic action. But they seem to be less suitable to indicate situations of intraoperative wakefulness or awareness. The mid-latency auditory evoked potentials are depressed dose-dependently by a series of anaesthetic agents, which correlate with the occurrence of situations of intraoperative wakefulness and awareness. There is a hierarchical correlation between certain values of the MLAEP and intraoperative wakefulness defined by purposeful movements, amnesic awareness with only implicit recall and conscious awareness with explicit recall. For some of the most commonly used anaesthetics reasonable threshold values of the MLAEP for the different states of consciousness have already been determined. Future studies in broad patient populations with all of the different routinely used anesthetics and procedures will have to finally identify the importance of the recording of mid-latency auditory evoked potentials as a routine method to assess the depth of anaesthesia.
Topics: Anesthesia; Awareness; Electroencephalography; Evoked Potentials; Humans
PubMed: 11355420
DOI: 10.1007/s001010050997 -
Anaesthesia Nov 1987
Review
Topics: Anesthesia, General; Animals; Awareness; Brain; Cognition; Electroencephalography; Humans
PubMed: 3324815
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2044.1987.tb05219.x