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Current Opinion in Psychology Apr 2022Moral courage, that is, defending moral beliefs despite personal risks, is often seen as a hallmark of prosocial behavior. We argue that prosociality in moral courage... (Review)
Review
Moral courage, that is, defending moral beliefs despite personal risks, is often seen as a hallmark of prosocial behavior. We argue that prosociality in moral courage is, however, complex. While its prosociality is often evident at a higher societal level, it can be contested in some aspects of morally courageous acts. We review the literature on two such aspects and highlight that differences and conflicts in moral beliefs, as well as the confrontational nature of many morally courageous acts, call into question prosociality. We recommend that future research takes the complexity of prosociality in moral courage into account to obtain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of moral courage and its contributions to the functioning of societies.
Topics: Altruism; Courage; Ethics, Nursing; Humans; Morals
PubMed: 34634716
DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.004 -
Annual Review of Psychology Jan 2021This review covers theory and research on the psychological characteristics and consequences of attitudes that are experienced as moral convictions, that is, attitudes... (Review)
Review
This review covers theory and research on the psychological characteristics and consequences of attitudes that are experienced as moral convictions, that is, attitudes that people perceive as grounded in a fundamental distinction between right and wrong. Morally convicted attitudes represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., strong but nonmoral attitudes or religious beliefs), are perceived as universally and objectively true, and are comparatively immune to authority or peer influence. Variance in moral conviction also predicts important social and political consequences. Stronger moral conviction about a given attitude object, for example, is associated with greater intolerance of attitude dissimilarity, resistance to procedural solutions for conflict about that issue, and increased political engagement and volunteerism in that attitude domain. Finally, we review recent research that explores the processes that lead to attitude moralization; we integrate these efforts and conclude with a new domain theory of attitude moralization.
Topics: Attitude; Group Processes; Humans; Morals
PubMed: 32886586
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-063020-030612 -
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Sep 2022Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism,... (Review)
Review
Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.
Topics: Humans; Morals; Cognition; Self-Control; Motivation
PubMed: 36111617
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X22002047 -
Progress in Brain Research 2018There has been a controversy on the moral import of music and art in general. On the one hand, the moralist view contends that there is some sort of link between art and... (Review)
Review
There has been a controversy on the moral import of music and art in general. On the one hand, the moralist view contends that there is some sort of link between art and morality, even if the way to specify this link may be highly diverse. It comprises most of the classical views of art, from Schiller's view of the role of artistic education in moral development, to any view that declares a form of art as corrupt or degenerated, or enlightening. What it is assumed minimally in all of them is that the moral import of an artwork contributes to its aesthetic value. On the other hand, formalist views claim that the aesthetic value of an artwork is genuine and autonomous, and therefore it is independent of any other value. In this chapter we focus on music, as the most difficult case for the moralist standpoint, given the lack of representational content of music. We argue for a variety of the moralist's view according to which the moral import of a musical artwork is not derived from its content (obviously, as it lack any), but from its pragmatics: the context and the intentions that guide its composition and performance, by analogy with any other intentional action, and point to the emotional impact of music as the common ground that bridges moral and aesthetic values. As a provisional conclusion, we outline a research program for brain studies that follows from this proposal, as a way test its predictions, focusing both on the emotional grounds of valuation and their context-dependency.
Topics: Brain; Emotions; Esthetics; Humans; Morals; Music
PubMed: 29779750
DOI: 10.1016/bs.pbr.2018.03.015 -
Current Opinion in Psychology Oct 2022Society suffers when people stay silent on moral issues. Yet people who engage morally may appear hypocritical if they behave imperfectly themselves. Research reveals... (Review)
Review
Society suffers when people stay silent on moral issues. Yet people who engage morally may appear hypocritical if they behave imperfectly themselves. Research reveals that hypocrites can-but do not always-trigger a "hypocrisy penalty," whereby they are evaluated as more immoral than ordinary (non-hypocritical) wrongdoers. This pattern reflects that moral engagement can confer reputational benefits, but can also carry reputational costs when paired with inconsistent moral conduct. We discuss mechanisms underlying these costs and benefits, illuminating when hypocrisy is (and is not) evaluated negatively. Our review highlights the role that dishonesty and other factors play in engendering disdain for hypocrites, and offers suggestions for how, in a world where nobody is perfect, people can engage morally without generating backlash.
Topics: Humans; Morals; Risk; Social Behavior
PubMed: 35914486
DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101404 -
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Jun 2013Moralizing religions, unlike religions with morally indifferent gods or spirits, appeared only recently in some (but not all) large-scale human societies. A crucial... (Review)
Review
Moralizing religions, unlike religions with morally indifferent gods or spirits, appeared only recently in some (but not all) large-scale human societies. A crucial feature of these new religions is their emphasis on proportionality (between deeds and supernatural rewards, between sins and penance, and in the formulation of the Golden Rule, according to which one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself). Cognitive science models that account for many properties of religion can be extended to these religions. Recent models of evolved dispositions for fairness in cooperation suggest that proportionality-based morality is highly intuitive to human beings. The cultural success of moralizing movements, secular or religious, could be explained based on proportionality.
Topics: Culture; History, Ancient; Humans; Interpersonal Relations; Morals; Religion; Religion and Psychology
PubMed: 23664451
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.04.003 -
Perspectives on Psychological Science :... Jan 2022Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In...
Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Learning; Morals
PubMed: 34264152
DOI: 10.1177/1745691621990636 -
Nursing Management Mar 2021
Topics: Humans; Morale; Morals
PubMed: 33633014
DOI: 10.1097/01.NUMA.0000733652.27670.8a -
Bioethics Jul 2023Skepticism about ethical expertise has grown common, raising concerns that bioethicists' roles are inappropriate or depend on something other than expertise in ethics....
Skepticism about ethical expertise has grown common, raising concerns that bioethicists' roles are inappropriate or depend on something other than expertise in ethics. While these roles may depend on skills other than those of expertise, overlooking the role of expertise in ethics distorts our conception of moral advising. This paper argues that motivations to reject ethical expertise often stem from concerns about elitism: either an intellectualist elitism, where some privileged elite have supposedly special access in virtue of expertise in moral theory; or an authoritarian elitism, where our reliance on experts in ethics risks violation of autonomy and democracy. The paper sketches an anti-elitist conception of ethics expertise in bioethics as continuous with an anti-elitist conception of ethics expertise in common moral practice, undercutting the intellectualism, and then uses this anti-elitist conception to reject arguments that ethical expertise violates autonomy or democracy. An anti-elitist picture of ethical expertise both renders it consistent with our general moral practice and allows us to resist skeptical concerns.
Topics: Humans; Morals; Bioethics; Ethicists; Ethical Theory; Dissent and Disputes
PubMed: 35403726
DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13034 -
Conservation Biology : the Journal of... Oct 2020Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are...
Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.
Topics: Africa; Animals; Australia; Conservation of Natural Resources; Morals; Northwestern United States; Rabbits
PubMed: 31953967
DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13463