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Cognition Mar 2021Humans use punishment to influence each other's behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that...
Humans use punishment to influence each other's behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Experiment 1). Under some situations, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Experiment 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Experiment 3). And people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Experiment 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to be constructed and interpreted as a communicative act.
Topics: Communication; Humans; Motivation; Punishment; Reward
PubMed: 33383397
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104544 -
Emotion (Washington, D.C.) Jun 2020Humans routinely punish others for violating social norms. This behavior is referred to as third-party punishment. Much of the research on this topic has been done in...
Humans routinely punish others for violating social norms. This behavior is referred to as third-party punishment. Much of the research on this topic has been done in the context of group cooperation and unjust economic interactions. However, little is known about punishment in response to other types of more personal transgressions. In the present study, we sought to determine whether adults would punish an individual after viewing them undeservingly reject a stranger. We experimentally demonstrate that after observing an individual socially reject an unknown victim, individuals will engage in third-party punishment. Individuals who reported feeling upset with the rejecter were most likely to punish, while feeling sorry for the victim was not predictive of punishment behavior. These findings highlight the motivational role of empathic anger in punishing social norm transgressors. Notably, individuals who reported having been bullied in their own pasts were the most likely to punish the rejecter. These results demonstrate how a history of being bullied may make one more attuned to the social rejection of others and in turn may make one more likely to take retributive action on behalf of another. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Adolescent; Adult; Female; Group Processes; Humans; Male; Punishment; Rejection, Psychology; Young Adult
PubMed: 31008619
DOI: 10.1037/emo0000607 -
Nature Jan 1995Although positive reciprocity (reciprocal altruism) has been a focus of interest in evolutionary biology, negative reciprocity (retaliatory infliction of fitness... (Review)
Review
Although positive reciprocity (reciprocal altruism) has been a focus of interest in evolutionary biology, negative reciprocity (retaliatory infliction of fitness reduction) has been largely ignored. In social animals, retaliatory aggression is common, individuals often punish other group members that infringe their interests, and punishment can cause subordinates to desist from behaviour likely to reduce the fitness of dominant animals. Punishing strategies are used to establish and maintain dominance relationships, to discourage parasites and cheats, to discipline offspring or prospective sexual partners and to maintain cooperative behaviour.
Topics: Aggression; Animals; Biological Evolution; Cooperative Behavior; Female; Game Theory; Humans; Male; Predatory Behavior; Punishment; Reproduction; Social Dominance
PubMed: 7816134
DOI: 10.1038/373209a0 -
PloS One 2020A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team...
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.
Topics: Competitive Behavior; Cooperative Behavior; Group Processes; Humans; Models, Psychological; Punishment; Reward
PubMed: 32941442
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0236544 -
Physical Review. E Jun 2020Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy...
Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy alongside cooperation and defection, and it is commonly assumed to be executed based on individual decision rules rather than collective decision rules. Differently from previous works, we employ a democratic procedure by which cooperators cast votes independently and simultaneously for whether to impose punishment on defectors, and we establish a relationship between the cooperators' willingness to punish defectors (WTPD) and whether the punishment is inflicted on defectors. The results illustrate that the population can evolve to full cooperation under consensual punishment. It is noteworthy that, compared with autonomous punishment, whether consensual punishment is more in favor of cooperation crucially depends on the minimum number of votes required for punishment execution as well as the cooperators' WTPD. Our findings highlight the importance of collective decision making in the evolution of cooperation and may provide a mathematical framework for explaining the prevalence of democracy in modern societies.
Topics: Consensus; Cooperative Behavior; Democracy; Models, Theoretical; Punishment
PubMed: 32688481
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.101.062419 -
Cognition & Emotion Aug 2020Third-party punishment occurs when a perpetrator of a transgression is punished by another person who was not directly affected by the transgression (i.e. a...
Third-party punishment occurs when a perpetrator of a transgression is punished by another person who was not directly affected by the transgression (i.e. a third-party). Given gratitude's demonstrated ability to enhance both cooperation and the value people place on future-rewards, its capacity to increase third-party punishment - a phenomenon theorised to increase future cooperative behaviour - was investigated. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to experience one of three emotional states (i.e. gratitude, happiness, or neutrality) prior to making decisions about how much of a previous financial endowment they would spend to punish a person who transgressed against another at differing degrees within the context of a dictator game. As expected, punishment expenditures decreased for all participants as a dictator's decision became fairer. Of primary interest, however, participants who felt grateful, as compared to those who felt neutral or happy, engaged in significantly more third-party punishment across dictator splits that were not altruistic in nature.
Topics: Altruism; Cooperative Behavior; Decision Making; Emotions; Female; Humans; Male; Morals; Punishment; Young Adult
PubMed: 31814516
DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2019.1700100 -
Journal of Abnormal Psychology Feb 2021Paranoia is the exaggerated belief that harm will occur and is intended by others. Although commonly framed in terms of attributing malicious intent to others, recent...
Paranoia is the exaggerated belief that harm will occur and is intended by others. Although commonly framed in terms of attributing malicious intent to others, recent work has explored how paranoia also affects social decision-making, using economic games. Previous work found that paranoia is associated with decreased cooperation and increased punishment in the Dictator Game (where cooperating and punishing involve paying a cost to respectively increase or decrease a partner's income). These findings suggest that paranoia might be associated with variation in subjective reward from positive and/or negative social decision-making, a possibility we explore using a preregistered experiment with U.S.-based participants (n = 2,004). Paranoia was associated with increased self-reported enjoyment of negative social interactions and decreased self-reported enjoyment of prosocial interactions. More paranoid participants attributed stronger harmful intent to a partner. Harmful intent attributions and the enjoyment of negative social interactions positively predicted the tendency to pay to punish the partner. Cooperation was positively associated with the tendency to enjoy prosocial interactions and increased with participant age. There was no main effect of paranoia on tendency to cooperate in this setting. We discuss these findings in light of previous research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Adolescent; Adult; Aged; Aged, 80 and over; Female; Humans; Intention; Male; Middle Aged; Paranoid Disorders; Punishment; Reward; Social Interaction; Social Perception; United States; Young Adult
PubMed: 33271038
DOI: 10.1037/abn0000647 -
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of... Apr 1963Responses were maintained by a variable-interval schedule of food reinforcement. At the same time, punishment was delivered following every nth response (fixed-ratio...
Responses were maintained by a variable-interval schedule of food reinforcement. At the same time, punishment was delivered following every nth response (fixed-ratio punishment). The introduction of fixed-ratio punishment produced an initial phase during which the emission of responses was positively accelerated between punishments. Eventually, the degree of positive acceleration was reduced and a uniform but reduced rate of responding emerged. Large changes in the over-all level of responding were produced by the intensity of punishment, the value of the punishment ratio, and the level of food deprivation. The uniformity of response rate between punishments was invariant in spite of these changes in over-all rate and contrary to some plausible a priori theoretical considerations. Fixed-ratio punishment also produced phenomena previously observed under continuous punishment: warm-up effect and a compensatory increase. This type of intermittent punishment produced less rapid and less complete suppression than did continuous punishment.
Topics: Punishment; Reinforcement, Psychology
PubMed: 13965779
DOI: 10.1901/jeab.1963.6-141 -
Scientific Reports Aug 2023Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are...
Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenance of society. Past studies have provided strong evidence that people are willing to incur costs to punish selfish behaviors and to reward altruistic behaviors, but how their willingness to do so depends on their relationship with the individuals conducting the anti-social or pro-social behaviors is much less explored. To probe into this question, we devised a three-stage experiment that combined a revised dictator game and third-party reward or punishment. We employed two payoff frameworks, alignment and conflict, and analyzed how third-party's willingness to reward and punish differed when their interests were either aligned or in conflict with the first-party under observation. We found that due to considerations for personal interests, third-party's reward and punishment levels deviated from what was deemed "legitimate" by society, that is, the level of reward and punishment that enhances society's intrinsic motivations to comply with social norms and act pro-socially. When an anti-social behavior was observed, third-party punished less severely under the alignment framework than under the conflict framework; when a pro-social behavior was observed, third-party demonstrated self-serving reward under the alignment framework, but they rewarded altruistically under the conflict framework. These findings provided evidence for third-party's self-serving reward and punishment.
Topics: Humans; Punishment; Laboratories; Altruism; Social Behavior; Reward
PubMed: 37634044
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41256-5 -
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology Jun 2022Why do children, adolescents, and adults engage in costly punishment to sanction fairness violations? Two studies investigated the differential impact of incidental...
Why do children, adolescents, and adults engage in costly punishment to sanction fairness violations? Two studies investigated the differential impact of incidental anger on the costly punishment of 8-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and adults. Focusing on experimentally manipulated incidental anger allows for a causal investigation as to whether and how anger affects costly punishment in these age groups in addition to other motives such as inequity aversion. Study 1 (N = 210) assessed the effect of incidental anger (vs. a neutral emotion) on second-party punishment, where punishers were direct victims of fairness violations. Study 2 (N = 208) examined third-party punishment, where the punisher was an observer unaffected by the violation. Across ages, incidental anger increased the second-party punishment of unequal offers but not equal offers. Thus, anger seems to play a causal role in the punishment of unfairness when fairness violations are self-relevant. As predicted, adults' third-party punishment of unequal offers was higher in the incidental anger condition than in the neutral emotion condition. Children's third-party punishment of unfairness was not affected by the emotion condition, but incidental anger increased adolescents' third-party punishment across offers. Overall, our data suggest that the association between anger and costly punishment is based on the self-relevance of the violation. In third-party situations, where unfairness does not affect the self, social-cognitive processes that develop well into adulthood, such as emotional appraisals, might be necessary for third parties to engage in costly punishment.
Topics: Adolescent; Adult; Affect; Anger; Child; Emotions; Humans; Motivation; Punishment
PubMed: 35114578
DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105376