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Journal of Experimental Child Psychology Jun 2023Children's punishment behavior may be driven by both retribution and deterrence, but the potential primacy of either motive is unknown. Moreover, children's punishment...
Children's punishment behavior may be driven by both retribution and deterrence, but the potential primacy of either motive is unknown. Moreover, children's punishment enjoyment and compensation enjoyment have never been directly contrasted. Here, British, Colombian, and Italian 7- to 11-year-old children (N = 123) operated a Justice System in which they viewed different moral transgressions in Minecraft, a globally popular video game, either face-to-face with an experimenter or over the internet. Children could respond to transgressions by punishing transgressors and compensating victims. The purpose of the system was framed in terms of retribution, deterrence, or compensation between participants. Children's performance, endorsement, and enjoyment of punishment and compensation were measured, along with their endorsement of retribution versus deterrence as punishment justifications, during and/or after justice administration. Children overwhelmingly endorsed deterrence over retribution as their punishment justification irrespective of age. When asked to reproduce the presented frame in their own words, children more reliably reproduced the deterrence frame rather than the retribution frame. Punishment enjoyment decreased while compensation enjoyment increased over time. Despite enjoying compensation more, children preferentially endorsed punishment over compensation, especially with increasing age and transgression severity. Reported deterrent justifications, superior reproduction of deterrence framing, lower enjoyment of punishment than of compensation, and higher endorsement of punishment over compensation together suggest that children felt that they ought to mete out punishment as a means to deter future transgressions. Face-to-face and internet-mediated responses were not distinguishable, supporting a route to social psychology research with primary school-aged children unable to physically visit labs.
Topics: Humans; Child; Punishment; Motivation; Pleasure; Happiness; Emotions
PubMed: 36731278
DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105630 -
Psychophysiology Feb 2012The current study examined whether punishment has direct and lasting effects on error-related brain activity, and whether this effect is larger with increasing trait...
The current study examined whether punishment has direct and lasting effects on error-related brain activity, and whether this effect is larger with increasing trait anxiety. Participants were told that errors on a flanker task would be punished in some blocks but not others. Punishment was applied following 50% of errors in punished blocks during the first half of the experiment (i.e., acquisition), but never in the second half (i.e., extinction). The ERN was enhanced in the punished blocks in both experimental phases--this enhancement remained stable throughout the extinction phase. More anxious individuals were characterized by larger punishment-related modulations in the ERN. The study reveals evidence for lasting, punishment-based modulations of the ERN that increase with anxiety. These data suggest avenues for research to examine more specific learning-related mechanisms that link anxiety to overactive error monitoring.
Topics: Adolescent; Anxiety; Association Learning; Brain; Electroencephalography; Evoked Potentials; Female; Humans; Male; Psychomotor Performance; Punishment; Reaction Time; Young Adult
PubMed: 22092041
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01298.x -
Neuroscience Bulletin May 2022People as third-party observers, without direct self-interest, may punish norm violators to maintain social norms. However, third-party judgment and the follow-up...
People as third-party observers, without direct self-interest, may punish norm violators to maintain social norms. However, third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame (i.e., verbally describe) a norm violation. We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon, which we call the "third-party framing effect". In these experiments, participants observed an anonymous perpetrator deciding whether to keep her/his economic benefit while exposing a victim to a risk of physical pain (described as "harming others" in one condition and "not helping others" in the other condition), then they had a chance to punish that perpetrator at their own cost. Our results showed that the participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame, manifesting a framing effect. Self-reported anger toward perpetrators mediated the relationship between empathy toward victims and the framing effect. Meanwhile, activation of the insula mediated the relationship between mid-cingulate cortex activation and the framing effect; the functional connectivity between these regions significantly predicted the size of the framing effect. These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.
Topics: Empathy; Female; Gyrus Cinguli; Humans; Neuroimaging; Pain; Punishment
PubMed: 34988911
DOI: 10.1007/s12264-021-00808-3 -
Proceedings. Biological Sciences Feb 2011Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial...
Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one's reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.
Topics: Computer Simulation; Cooperative Behavior; Game Theory; Humans; Models, Psychological; Punishment
PubMed: 20719773
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2010.1275 -
Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical... Feb 2022Punishments can help inform us to make adaptive changes in behavior. However, previous research suggested that only low punishment-sensitive individuals "learn" from...
Punishments can help inform us to make adaptive changes in behavior. However, previous research suggested that only low punishment-sensitive individuals "learn" from punishment, whereas high punishment-sensitive individuals do not. Here we used a flanker interference task with performance-contingent punishment signals to test the hypothesis that a clinical group characterized by heightened punishment sensitivity (i.e., patients with anorexia nervosa [AN]) would fail to adapt to conflict following punishment. To distinguish between state and trait factors, we tested for between-group differences in separate cohorts of acutely underweight patients (acAN; = 40) and weight-recovered former patients (recAN; = 25) relative to age-matched healthy controls ( = 48). The acAN patients showed an abnormally reversed congruency-sequence effect in error rates following punishment, despite generally superior accuracy, suggesting that punishment distracted acAN patients and interfered with interference control. The influence of punishment was more subtle in recAN and did not reach statistical significance, but both reaction time and error rate data hinted that elevated sensitivity to punishment negatively affects cognitive control even after long-term weight normalization. Together, these findings emphasize that punishment sensitivity may be a clinically relevant trait marker in AN and provide novel experimental evidence that punishment may have a detrimental impact on adaptive behavior in the disorder. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Anorexia Nervosa; Cognition; Humans; Punishment; Reaction Time; Thinness
PubMed: 34941315
DOI: 10.1037/abn0000713 -
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of... Jul 2022The present experiment investigated the effects of 1) repeated exposures to escalating punishment intensities and 2) repeated exposure to punishment after periods of...
The present experiment investigated the effects of 1) repeated exposures to escalating punishment intensities and 2) repeated exposure to punishment after periods of vacation on response allocation between punished and unpunished responding in three groups of rats. The first group (intensity + vacation) experienced repeated exposures to escalating punishment intensities after a period of vacation (i.e., return to baseline) from punishment. The second group (intensity-only) experienced repeated exposures to escalating punishment intensities without vacation from punishment. The third group (vacation-only) experienced repeated exposures to a constant punishment intensity after a period of vacation from punishment. Results showed that superimposition of punishment on one of two concurrently available responses decreased allocation toward the punished response and increased allocation toward the unpunished response. Furthermore, greater changes in allocation were observed with the introduction of a moderate constant intensity than with the introduction of a low intensity that increased across sessions. Reexposure to punishment had different effects between the groups. Although there was evidence that high shock intensities can enhance the efficacy of lower intensities to shift allocation away from the punished response and toward the unpunished response, there was little evidence of changes in response allocation with reintroduction of punishment after a period of vacation.
Topics: Animals; Punishment; Rats
PubMed: 35553429
DOI: 10.1002/jeab.766 -
Journal of Theoretical Biology Dec 2015Investigation of anti-social punishment has shaken the positive role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. However, punishment is ubiquitous in nature, and the...
Investigation of anti-social punishment has shaken the positive role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. However, punishment is ubiquitous in nature, and the centralized, apposed to decentralized, punishment is more favored by certain modern societies in particular. To explore the underlying principle of such phenomenon, we study the evolution of cooperation in the context of pro- and anti-social punishments subject to two distinct patterns: costly centralized and decentralized punishments. The results suggest that the pattern of punishment has a great effect on the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation. In the absence of anti-social punishment, the costly centralized punishment is more effective in promoting the emergence of cooperation. Anti-social punishment can subvert the positive role of punishment when anti- and pro-social punishments are in the same pattern. However, driven by centralized pro-social punishment, cooperation can be more advantageous than defection even in the presence of decentralized anti-social punishment.
Topics: Animals; Biological Evolution; Cooperative Behavior; Game Theory; Models, Psychological; Punishment
PubMed: 26408337
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.009 -
Psychological Bulletin Jul 2011How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate... (Meta-Analysis)
Meta-Analysis
How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation.A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d =0.51 and 0.70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.
Topics: Cooperative Behavior; Costs and Cost Analysis; Humans; Motivation; Psychological Theory; Publication Bias; Punishment; Reward; Social Behavior
PubMed: 21574679
DOI: 10.1037/a0023489 -
PloS One 2013Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after punishment. However, no such effect was found in previous work. In the present study, we...
Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after punishment. However, no such effect was found in previous work. In the present study, we demonstrate in a flanker task how behavioural adjustments following punishment signals are highly dependent on punishment sensitivity (as measured by the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) scale): Whereas low punishment-sensitive participants do show increased conflict adaptation after punishment, high punishment-sensitive participants show no such modulation. Interestingly, participants with a high punishment-sensitivity showed an overall reaction time increase after punishments. Our results stress the role of individual differences in explaining motivational modulations of cognitive control.
Topics: Adaptation, Psychological; Adolescent; Cognition; Conflict, Psychological; Female; Humans; Individuality; Inhibition, Psychological; Male; Motivation; Punishment; Reaction Time; Young Adult
PubMed: 24058520
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074106 -
Nature Feb 2016Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear...
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of trustworthiness. Our model is based on individual differences in the costs and/or benefits of being trustworthy. We argue that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (for example, because mechanisms that incentivize some individuals to be trustworthy also create benefits for deterring selfishness via TPP). We show that because of this relationship, it can be advantageous for individuals to punish selfishness in order to signal that they are not selfish themselves. We then empirically validate our model using economic game experiments. We show that TPP is indeed a signal of trustworthiness: third-party punishers are trusted more, and actually behave in a more trustworthy way, than non-punishers. Furthermore, as predicted by our model, introducing a more informative signal--the opportunity to help directly--attenuates these signalling effects. When potential punishers have the chance to help, they are less likely to punish, and punishment is perceived as, and actually is, a weaker signal of trustworthiness. Costly helping, in contrast, is a strong and highly used signal even when TPP is also possible. Together, our model and experiments provide a formal reputational account of TPP, and demonstrate how the costs of punishing may be recouped by the long-run benefits of signalling one's trustworthiness.
Topics: Cooperative Behavior; Games, Experimental; Humans; Models, Psychological; Punishment; Trust
PubMed: 26911783
DOI: 10.1038/nature16981