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ENeuro 2018"Good science" means answering important questions convincingly, a challenging endeavor under the best of circumstances. Our inability to replicate many biomedical...
"Good science" means answering important questions convincingly, a challenging endeavor under the best of circumstances. Our inability to replicate many biomedical studies has been the subject of numerous commentaries both in the scientific and lay press. In response, statistics has re-emerged as a necessary tool to improve the objectivity of study conclusions. However, psychological aspects of decision making introduce preconceived preferences into scientific judgment that cannot be eliminated by any statistical method. The psychology of decision making, expounded by Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler, is well known in the field of economics, but the underlying concepts of cognitive psychology are also relevant to scientific judgments. I repeated experiments carried out on undergraduates by Kahneman and colleagues four to five decades ago, but with scientists, and obtained essentially the same results. The experiments were in the form of written reactions to scenarios, and participants were scientists at all career stages. The findings reinforce the roles that two inherent intuitions play in scientific decision making: our drive to create a coherent narrative from new data regardless of its quality or relevance and our inclination to seek patterns in data whether they exist or not. Moreover, we do not always consider how likely a result is regardless of its value. Low statistical power and inattention to principles underpinning Bayesian statistics reduce experimental rigor, but mitigating skills can be learned. Overcoming our natural human tendency to make quick decisions and jump to conclusions is a deeper obstacle to doing good science; this too can be learned.
Topics: Bayes Theorem; Cognition; Decision Making; Humans; Judgment; Learning; Research; Research Design; Science
PubMed: 30197928
DOI: 10.1523/ENEURO.0188-18.2018 -
Cognitive Science Apr 2017People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged...
People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., about murder) versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., about abortion). The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change (Study 2) and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change (Study 3). We discuss the role that social relationships play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy.
Topics: Adult; Aged; Female; Humans; Judgment; Male; Memory; Middle Aged; Morals; Social Identification; Young Adult
PubMed: 26936631
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12354 -
Cognitive Research: Principles and... Oct 2020The wisdom of crowds and collective decision-making are important tools for integrating information between individuals, which can exceed the capacity of individual...
BACKGROUND
The wisdom of crowds and collective decision-making are important tools for integrating information between individuals, which can exceed the capacity of individual judgments. They are based on different forms of information integration. The wisdom of crowds refers to the aggregation of many independent judgments without deliberation and consensus, while collective decision-making is aggregation with deliberation and consensus. Recent research has shown that collective decision-making outperforms the wisdom of crowds. Additionally, many studies have shown that metacognitive knowledge of subjective confidence is useful for improving aggregation performance. However, because most of these studies have employed relatively simple problems; for example, involving general knowledge and estimating values and quantities of objects, it remains unclear whether their findings can be generalized to real-life situations involving complex information integration. This study explores the performance and process of the wisdom of crowds and collective decision-making by applying the wisdom of crowds with weighted confidence to a survival situation task commonly used in studies of collective decision-making.
RESULTS
The wisdom of crowds and collective decision-making outperformed individual judgment. However, collective decision-making did not outperform the wisdom of crowds. Contrary to previous studies, weighted confidence showed no advantage from comparison between confidence-weighted and non-weighted aggregations; a simulation analysis varying in group size and sensitivity of confidence weighting revealed interaction between group size and sensitivity of confidence weighting. This reveals that it is because of small group size and not the peculiarity of the survival task that results in no advantage of weighted confidence.
CONCLUSIONS
The study's findings suggest that the wisdom of crowds could be applicable to complex problem-solving tasks, and interaction between group size and sensitivity of confidence weighting is important for confidence-weighted aggregation effects.
Topics: Adolescent; Adult; Computer Simulation; Decision Making; Female; Group Processes; Humans; Judgment; Male; Metacognition; Task Performance and Analysis; Young Adult
PubMed: 33057843
DOI: 10.1186/s41235-020-00248-z -
Proceedings of the National Academy of... Apr 2013Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for... (Comparative Study)
Comparative Study
Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants' moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.
Topics: Adolescent; Adult; Autistic Disorder; Brain Mapping; Female; Humans; Intention; Judgment; Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Male; Middle Aged; Morals; Parietal Lobe; Temporal Lobe; Theory of Mind; Young Adult
PubMed: 23479657
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1207992110 -
Journal of Neurophysiology Sep 2019Decision making is a fundamental subfield within neuroscience. While recent findings have yielded major advances in our understanding of decision making, confidence in...
Decision making is a fundamental subfield within neuroscience. While recent findings have yielded major advances in our understanding of decision making, confidence in such decisions remains poorly understood. In this paper, we present a confidence signal detection (CSD) model that combines a standard signal detection model yielding a noisy decision variable with a model of confidence. The CSD model requires quantitative measures of confidence obtained by recording confidence probability judgments. Specifically, we model confidence probability judgments for binary direction recognition (e.g., did I move left or right) decisions. We use our CSD model to study both confidence calibration (i.e., how does confidence compare with performance) and the distributions of confidence probability judgments. We evaluate two variants of our CSD model: a conventional model with two free parameters (CSD2) that assumes that confidence is well calibrated and our new model with three free parameters (CSD3) that includes an additional confidence scaling factor. On average, our CSD2 and CSD3 models explain 73 and 82%, respectively, of the variance found in our empirical data set. Furthermore, for our large data sets consisting of 3,600 trials per subject, correlation and residual analyses suggest that the CSD3 model better explains the predominant aspects of the empirical data than the CSD2 model, especially for subjects whose confidence is not well calibrated. Moreover, simulations show that asymmetric confidence distributions can lead traditional confidence calibration analyses to suggest "underconfidence" even when confidence is perfectly calibrated. These findings show that this CSD model can be used to help improve our understanding of confidence and decision making. We make life-or-death decisions each day; our actions depend on our "confidence." Though confidence, accuracy, and response time are the three pillars of decision making, we know little about confidence. In a previous paper, we presented a new model - dependent on a single scaling parameter - that transforms decision variables to confidence. Here we show that this model explains the empirical human confidence distributions obtained during a vestibular direction recognition task better than standard signal detection models.
Topics: Adult; Decision Making; Female; Humans; Judgment; Male; Metacognition; Models, Theoretical; Motion Perception; Signal Detection, Psychological
PubMed: 31215314
DOI: 10.1152/jn.00400.2016 -
Psychological Research Jul 2022There is a notion that mathematical equations can be considered aesthetic objects. However, whereas some aesthetic experiences are triggered primarily by the sensory...
There is a notion that mathematical equations can be considered aesthetic objects. However, whereas some aesthetic experiences are triggered primarily by the sensory properties of objects, for mathematical equations aesthetic judgments extend beyond their sensory qualities and are also informed by semantics and knowledge. Therefore, to the extent that expertise in mathematics represents the accumulation of domain knowledge, it should influence aesthetic judgments of equations. In a between-groups study design involving university students who majored in mathematics (i.e., experts) or not (i.e., laypeople), we found support for the hypothesis that mathematics majors exhibit more agreement in their aesthetic judgments of equations-reflecting a greater degree of shared variance driven by formal training in the domain. Furthermore, their judgments were driven more strongly by familiarity and meaning than was the case for laypeople. These results suggest that expertise via advanced training in mathematics alters (and sharpens) aesthetic judgments of mathematical equations.
Topics: Esthetics; Humans; Judgment; Mathematics; Semantics
PubMed: 34495389
DOI: 10.1007/s00426-021-01592-5 -
Journal of Experimental Psychology.... Jan 2023The refers to when people's expectations about an uncertain event are biased by outcome preferences. Prior work has provided limited evidence that the magnitude of this...
The refers to when people's expectations about an uncertain event are biased by outcome preferences. Prior work has provided limited evidence that the magnitude of this motivated bias depends on (is moderated by) how expectations are solicited-as discrete outcome predictions or as likelihood judgments expressed on more continuous scales. The present studies extended the generalizability and understanding of the moderating process. The authors proposed that solicitations of predictions and likelihood judgments have different connotations that ultimately affect how much bias is expressed; this varies from a prior account that attributed the moderation effect to response scale differences (dichotomous vs. continuous). Study 1 confirmed the connotation difference, with predictions being viewed as more affording of hunches. Studies 2-4 directly tested the moderation effect, and unlike prior work focusing on expectations for purely stochastic events, the present studies involved more naturalistic events for which likelihood information was not supplied or directly knowable. Before viewing scenes from a basketball game (Study 2) or an endurance race (Studies 3 and 4), participants were led to prefer one contestant over another. After viewing most of the closely fought contest, they made either a prediction or likelihood judgment about the outcome. Participants' tendency to forecast their preferred contestant to win was significantly stronger among those making predictions rather than likelihood judgments. In support of the proposed account, this effect persisted even when both types of solicitations offered only dichotomous response options. Broader implications for measuring and understanding people's expectations or forecasts are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Uncertainty; Probability
PubMed: 36048058
DOI: 10.1037/xge0001258 -
Scientific Reports Mar 2023Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According...
Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning.
Topics: Judgment; Emotions; Fear; Anger; Awareness
PubMed: 36997616
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-32242-y -
Cognition Sep 2023The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) has been an influential thesis since the earliest stages of western philosophy. According to a simple version of the PSR, for...
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) has been an influential thesis since the earliest stages of western philosophy. According to a simple version of the PSR, for every fact, there must be an explanation of that fact. In the present research, we investigate whether people presuppose a PSR-like principle in ordinary judgment. Across five studies (N = 1121 in total, U.S., Prolific), we find that participants consistently make judgments that conform to the PSR. Such judgments predictably track the metaphysical aspects of explanation relevant to the PSR (Study 1) and diverge from related epistemic judgments about expected explanations (Study 2) and value judgments about desired explanations (Study 3). Moreover, we find participants' PSR-conforming judgments apply to a large set of facts that were sampled from random Wikipedia entries (Studies 4-5). Altogether, the present research suggests that a metaphysical presumption plays an important role in our explanatory inquiry, one that is distinct from the role of the epistemic and non-epistemic values that have been the focus of much recent work in cognitive psychology and philosophy of science.
Topics: Humans; Judgment; Philosophy
PubMed: 37236018
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105479 -
Social Cognitive and Affective... Feb 2014This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13... (Comparative Study)
Comparative Study
This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances-but thou shalt not kill.
Topics: Analysis of Variance; Attitude to Death; Brain; Brain Mapping; Catholicism; Culture; Empathy; Female; Humans; Interpersonal Relations; Judgment; Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Morals; Neuropsychological Tests; Reaction Time; Secularism; Self Concept; Young Adult
PubMed: 23160812
DOI: 10.1093/scan/nss121